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chapter 2

The Case for Behaviorally
Informed Regulation
Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir

Policymakers approach human behavior largely through the perspective of the
“rational agent” model, which relies on normative, a priori analyses of the making
of rational decisions. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in
professional schools, and has come to dominate much of the formulation and
conduct of policy. An alternative view, developed mostly through empirical
behavioral research, provides a substantially different perspective on individual
behavior and its policy implications. Behavior, according to the empirical perspective, is the outcome of perceptions, impulses, and other processes that characterize the impressive machinery that we carry behind the eyes and between the
ears. These proclivities, research has shown, intrude upon and shape behavior,
often quite independently of deliberative intent, and in contrast with normative
ideals that people endorse upon reﬂection. The results are systematic behaviors that
are unforeseen and misunderstood by classical policy thinking. A more nuanced
behavioral perspective, such research suggests, can yield deeper understanding
and improved regulatory insight.
For example, while the causes of the recent mortgage crisis are myriad, a
central problem was that many borrowers took out loans that they did not
understand and could not afford. Their behavior is inconsistent with a model
of rational agents with perfect information and perfect foresight, and good regulation ought to take their rather common behavior into account. As discussed
below, an opt-out home mortgage plan, such as one that provides a standard
fixed-rate loan with straightforward terms, could be a start. A person could
then choose to opt out in favor of another mortgage plan, but only after being
shown comprehensible disclosures about the risks involved. Lenders will have
an incentive to make such disclosures properly because they will bear greater
liability or other costs in the case of default among those who have opted out.
In what follows, we outline the main tenets of the behavioral perspective,
we provide some examples of relevant policy applications, and we discuss the
implications of this analysis for the conduct of policy, particularly in the context
of a market economy.
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I. Human Behavior
In contrast with the rational agents of the classical theory, who make well
informed, carefully considered, and fully controlled choices, behavioral research
has shown that the availability of data does not always lead to effective communication and knowledge; understanding and intention do not necessarily lead to
a desired action; and purportedly inconsequential contextual nuances can shape
behavior and alter choices, often in ways that people themselves agree diminish
their well-being in unintended ways.

I.1 Context
Human behavior turns out to be heavily context dependent, a function of both
the person and the situation. One of the major lessons of modern psychological
research is the impressive power that the situation exerts, along with a persistent
tendency among people to underestimate that power relative to the presumed
influence of intention, education, or personality traits. Various studies have
documented the stunning capacity of situational factors to influence behaviors
that are typically seen to reflect deep-seated personal predispositions. In his nowclassic obedience studies, for example, Milgram (1974) showed how decidedly
mild situational pressures sufficed to generate persistent willingness on the part
of regular people to administer what they believed to be grave levels of electric
shock to innocent subjects. Along similar lines, Darley and Batson (1973)
recruited seminary students to deliver a practice sermon on the parable of the
Good Samaritan. While half the seminarians were told they had plenty of time,
others were led to believe they were running late. On their way to give the talk,
all participants passed an ostensibly injured man slumped and groaning in a
doorway. Whereas the majority of those with time to spare stopped to help,
a mere 10 percent of those who were running late stopped, the remaining 90
percent stepping over the victim and rushing along. In contrast with these participants’ ethical training and scholarship, the contextual nuance of a minor time
constraint proved decisive in the decision not to stop and help a suffering man.
As we analyze further below, the heavier-than-anticipated impact of context on
behavior increases the importance and responsibility of effective regulation.

I.2 Decisional Conflict
On a less dramatic note, but of substantial policy relevance, are findings
regarding the contextual impact of decisional conflict. People’s preferences are
typically constructed, not merely revealed, during the decision-making process
(Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006), and the construction of preferences can be heavily
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influenced by the nature and the context of decision, which can have nontrivial
regulatory implications, particularly as regards the proliferation of alternatives.
The classical view of decision making does not anticipate nor does it consider the implications of decisional conflict. Each option according to this view
is assigned a subjective value, or “utility,” and the person then proceeds to choose
the option assigned the highest utility. A direct consequence of this account is
that offering more alternatives is a good thing, since the more options there are,
the more likely the consumer is to find one that proves attractive.
In contrast, since preferences tend to be constructed in the context of a
decision, choices often prove difficult to make. People often search for a compelling rationale for choosing one option over another, and whereas sometimes
a compelling reason can be articulated, at other times no easy rationale presents
itself, rendering the conflict between options hard to resolve. Such conflict can
lead people to postpone the decision or to select a “default” option, and can generate preference patterns that are fundamentally different from those predicted
by accounts based on value maximization. In particular, the addition of options
can complicate (and, thus, “worsen”) the decision outcome while the normative
assumption is that added options only make things better.
Decisional conflict, for example, has been shown to yield a greater tendency
to search for alternatives when better options are available but the decision
is difficult than when relatively inferior options are available and the decision is
easy, even when expectations are otherwise the same (Tversky and Shafir 1992).
More generally, as choices become difficult, consumers naturally tend to defer
decisions, often indefinitely (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Shafir, Simonson, and
Tversky 1993; Tversky and Shafir 1992). In one study, expert physicians had to
decide about medication for a patient with osteoarthritis. These physicians were
more likely to decline prescribing a new medication when they had to choose
between two new medications than when only one new medication was available (Redelmeier and Shafir 1995); the difficulty of choosing between the two
medications presumably led some physicians to recommend not starting either
one. A similar pattern was documented with shoppers in an upscale grocery
store, where tasting booths offered the opportunity to taste six different jams in
one condition, or any of twenty-four jams in the second. Of those who stopped
to taste, 30 percent proceeded to purchase a jam from the six-jams selection,
whereas only 3 percent purchased a jam from the twenty-four–jam selection
(Iyengar and Lepper 2000).
Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir, and Zinman (2008) conducted a field
experiment with a local lender in South Africa to assess the relative importance
of various subtle psychological manipulations in the decision to take up a loan
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offer. Clients were sent letters offering large short-term loans at randomly
assigned interest rates. In addition, several psychological features on the offer
letter were also independently randomized, one of which was the number of
sample loans shown: the offer letters displayed either one example of a loan size
and term, along with respective monthly repayments, or it displayed four such
examples. In contrast with standard economic prediction and in line with conflictbased predictions, higher take-up was observed under the one-example description than under the multiple-example version. The magnitude of this effect was
large: the simple (one-example) description of the offer had the same positive
effect on take-up as dropping the monthly interest on these loans by more than
two percentage points. In a related finding, Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman (2004)
show that employees’ participation in 401(k) plans drops as the number of fund
options proposed by their employer increases.
Adherence to the default or status quo has also been observed in naturally
occurring “experiments.” One concerning insurance decisions occurred when
New Jersey and Pennsylvania both introduced the option of a limited right to
sue, entitling automobile drivers to lower insurance rates. The two states differed in their default option: New Jersey motorists needed to acquire the full right
to sue (transaction costs were minimal: a signature), whereas in Pennsylvania,
the full right to sue was the default, which could then be forfeited in favor of
the limited alternative. Whereas only about 20 percent of New Jersey drivers
chose to acquire the full right to sue, approximately 75 percent of Pennsylvania
drivers chose to retain it ( Johnson et al 1993). A second naturally occurring
“experiment” was recently observed in Europeans’ decisions about being potential
organ donors ( Johnson and Goldstein 2003). In some European nations drivers
are, by default, organ donors unless they elect not to be, whereas in other European
nations they are, by default, not donors unless they choose to be. Observed rates
of organ donors are almost 98 percent in the former nations and about 15 percent
in the latter—a remarkable difference, given the low transaction costs and the
significance of the decision.
These and other studies show that minor contextual changes can alter what
consumers choose in ways that are unlikely to relate to their ultimate utility. It
suggests that a proliferation of alternatives, which is where consumer markets
are typically headed, needs to be addressed and handled with care, rather than
be seen as an obvious advantage. It also suggests that the determination of a
default outcome, for example, rather than being conceived as a mere formality
that can be effortlessly circumvented, needs to be chosen thoughtfully, since it
acquires a privileged status. In effect, when multiple options or the status quo are
inappropriately handled (intentionally or not) this can decrease social welfare.
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I.3 Mental Accounting
In their intuitive mental accounting schemes, people compartmentalize wealth
and spending into distinct budget categories, such as savings, rent, and entertainment, and into separate mental accounts, such as current income, assets, and
future income (Thaler 1985; 1992). Contrary to standard assumptions of fungibility, people exhibit different degrees of willingness to spend from their various
accounts, which yields consumption patterns that are overly dependent on current
income and sensitive to labels so that, for example, people save and borrow
(often at a higher interest rate) at the same time (Ausubel 1991).
An understanding of such proclivities may help design instruments that
bring about more desirable outcomes. For example, given that people are susceptible to faulty planning, distraction, and procrastination, studies have shown
that saving works best as a default. Participation in 401(k) plans is significantly
higher when employers offer automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea 2001),
and because participants tend to retain the default contribution rates, savings
can be increased if they agree to increased default deductions following future
raises (Benartzi and Thaler 2004).

I.4 Construal
A simple but fundamental tension between classical economic analyses and
modern behavioral research is captured by the role of psychological “construal.”
Agents in classical economic analyses are presumed to choose among objective
options in the world. People, however, do not typically contemplate objective
circumstances; rather, stimuli are mentally construed, interpreted, represented,
and then acted upon. Behavior is directed not toward actual states of the world,
but toward our mental representation of those states, and mental representations do not bear a one-to-one relationship to the thing they represent, nor
do they necessarily constitute faithful renditions of actual circumstances. As a
result, many well-intentioned policy interventions can fail, or succeed, because
of the way in which they are construed by the targeted group. For example,
people who are rewarded for a behavior they find interesting and enjoyable can
come to attribute their interest in the behavior to the reward and, consequently,
come to view the behavior as less attractive (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973).
In one classic study, for example, children who were offered a “good player
award” to play with magic markers—which they had previously done with great
relish in the absence of extrinsic rewards—subsequently showed little interest
in the markers when these were introduced as an unawarded classroom activity
(in contrast with children who had not received an award and showed no
decrease in interest.) Similarly, decisions can be changed when preceded by a
The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation
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related act that leads to differential construal of one’s preferences. Several “footin-the-door” and “lowball” techniques are based on the premise that initial
compliance with a small request leads people to be then more likely to comply
with a larger one. In this vein, Freedman and Fraser (1966) have shown that
subjects are more likely to put up a large Drive Carefully sign on their lawn
if they have already complied with a request to put up a smaller one or to sign a
petition regarding careful driving, even when the requests were made by different people. Similarly, Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, and Miller’s (1978) subjects
were more likely to go pick up United Way posters if they had initially agreed
to display them, as compared to a group that had not first considered the more
modest request.
Other behavioral factors can influence the outcomes of decisions in ways
that standard analysis is likely to miss; however, a full summary is beyond our
present purview. To list just a few, people often are not very good at predicting
their future tastes or at learning from past experience (Kahneman 1994), and
their choices can be influenced by anticipated regret (Bell 1982), by costs
already incurred (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Gourville and Soman 1998), by overly
optimistic planning (Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994) and by the effects of
temporal separation, where high discount rates for future as compared to present
outcomes can yield dynamically inconsistent preferences (Loewenstein and
Elster 1992; Loewenstein and Thaler 1992). Contrary to standard assumptions,
the psychological carriers of value are gains and losses, rather than anticipated
final states of wealth, and attitudes toward risk tend to shift from risk aversion
in the face of gains to risk seeking for losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Also, people are loss averse (the loss associated with giving up a good is substantially greater than the utility associated with obtaining it (Tversky and
Kahneman 1991). This, in turn, leads to a general reluctance to depart from
the status quo, because what needs to be renounced is valued more highly than
the anticipated benefits (Knetsch 1989; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).

I.5 Knowledge and Attention
Standard theory assumes that consumers are attentive and knowledgeable, and
typically able to avail themselves of important information. In contrast, there
appears to be a rampant ignorance of options, program rules, benefits, and
opportunities, and not only among the poor or the uneducated. Surveys show that
fewer than one-fifth of investors (in stocks, bonds, funds, or other securities)
can be considered “financially literate” (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 1998), and
similar findings describe the understanding shown by participants in pension
plans—meaning, mostly, 401(k)s (Schultz 1995). Indeed, even older beneficiaries
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often do not know what kind of pension they are set to receive, or what mix of
stocks and bonds they are invested in.
The amount of information people attend to is limited, and cognitive load
has been shown to affect performance in everyday tasks. To the extent that consumers find themselves in challenging situations that are unfamiliar, distracting,
or tense, all of which consume cognitive resources, fewer resources will be available to process the information that is relevant to the decision at hand. This, in
turn, can make decision making even more dependent on situational cues and
immaterial considerations. Furthermore, this is likely to be even more true for
“low literate” participants, whose even more limited knowledge and understanding
can lead them to experience difficulties with effort-versus-accuracy tradeoffs, to
rely excessively on peripheral cues in product advertising and packaging, and
even to withdraw systematically from market interactions (Adkins and Ozanne
2005, and references therein.) In summary, for participants with limited cognitive resources, whose decisions are heavily dependent on perceived norms,
automatic defaults, and other minor contextual nuances, regulation merits even
greater attention.

I.6 Context and Institutions
The substantial influence of context on behavior naturally implies that institutions will come to play a central role in shaping how people think and what they
do. Among other things:

Institutions Shape Defaults
Institutions normally define defaults. Moreover, it is well established that defaults
can have a profound influence on the outcomes of individual choices. Data
available on decisions ranging from retirement savings and portfolio choices to
the decision to be a willing organ donor illustrate the substantial increase in
market share of default options ( Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Johnson et al
1993). Although the default in an abstract sense appears to be merely one among
a number of alternatives, in reality defaults benefit not only from confusion,
procrastination, forgetting, and other sources of inaction, but they may also
be perceived as the most popular option (this often becomes a self-fulfilling
prophesy), or the option implicitly recommended.
Institutions Shape Behavior
Many low-income families are, in fact, savers, whether or not they resort to
banks (Berry 2004). Without the help of a financial institution, however, their
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savings are at risk (including theft, impulse spending, and the needs of household members), savings will grow more slowly, and may not be readily available
to support access to reasonably priced credit in times of need. Institutions
provide safety and control. In circumstances of momentary need, temptation,
distraction, or limited self-control, those savers who are unbanked are likely
to find it all the more difficult to succeed on the path to long-term prosperity.
A recent survey conducted by the American Payroll Association shows that
“American employees are gaining confidence in direct deposit as a reliable
method of payment that gives them greater control over their finances, and that
employers are recognizing direct deposit as a low-cost employee benefit that can
also save payroll processing time and money.”1 The employers of the poor, in
contrast, often neither require nor propose electronic salary payments. Instead,
they prefer not to offer direct deposit to hourly, nonexempt employees, temporary or seasonal employees, part-timers, union employees, and employees in
remote locations—all categories that correlate with being low paid. The most
frequently stated reasons for not offering direct deposit to these employees
include lack of processing time to meet standard industry (“Automatic Clearing
House”) requirements, high turnover, and union contract restrictions. All this
creates a missed opportunity to offer favorable defaults to needy individuals,
whose de facto default consists of going after hours to cash their check for
a hefty fee.

Institutions Provide Implicit Planning
As it turns out, a variety of institutions provide implicit planning, often in ways
that address potential behavioral weaknesses. Credit card companies send customers timely reminders of due payments, and clients can elect to have their
utility bills automatically charged, allowing them to avoid late fees if occasionally they do not get around to paying in time. The low-income buyer, on the
other hand, without the credit card, the automatic billing, or the Web-based
reminders, risks missed payments, late fees, disconnected utilities (followed by
high reconnection charges), etc. Interestingly, context can also be detrimental
by providing debt too easily. Temporal discounting in general and present bias
in particular can be exploited to make cash now more attractive than future
costs appear menacing.
A behavioral analysis yields new appreciation for the impact and responsibility of financial institutions, which should be considered not merely from a
financial cost-saving point of view, but, instead, should be understood to affect
people’s lives, by easing their planning, facilitating their intended actions, or
enabling their resistance to temptation.
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II. Interaction with Markets
The perspective outlined above, and the regulation it triggers, need to be
embedded in the logic of markets. A framework is required that takes into
account firm incentives and responses to behaviorally motivated regulation. This
perspective produces two dimensions to consider. First, the psychological biases
of individuals can either help or hurt the firms they interact with; hence firms’
and public-minded regulators’ interests are sometimes misaligned and sometimes not. Consider a consumer who does not understand the profound effects
of the compounding of interest. Such a bias would lead the individual both to
undersave, and to overborrow. Society would prefer that the individual did
not have such a bias in both contexts. Firms, however, would prefer that the
individual not have the bias to undersave, so that funds intended for investment
and fee generation would not diminish (abstracting from fee structures), but, at
least over the short term, firms would be perfectly content to see the same individual overborrow (abstracting from collection costs). Because people are fallible
and easily misled, transparency does not always pay off and firms sometimes
have strong incentives to exacerbate psychological biases by hiding borrowing
costs. Regulation in this case faces a much more difficult challenge than in
the savings situation. The market response to individual failure can profoundly
affect regulation. In attempting to boost participation in 401(k) retirement
plans, the regulator faces at worst indifferent and at best positively inclined
employers seeking to boost employee retention and to comply with federal
pension rules.2 In forcing disclosure of hidden prices of credit, by contrast, the
regulator often faces noncooperative firms, whose interests are to find ways to
work around or undo interventions.
A second implication of our equilibrium model of firms in particular markets
interacting with individuals with specific psychologies is that the mode of
regulation chosen should take account of this interaction. We might think of
the regulator as holding two different levers, which we describe as changing
the rules and changing the scoring.3 When forcing disclosure of the APR, for
example, the regulator effectively changes the “rules” of the game: what a firm
must say. A stronger form of rule change is product regulation: changing what
a firm must do. Behavioral rule changes, such as creating a favored starting
position or default, falls between these two types. When changing liability or
providing tax incentives, by contrast, the regulator changes the way the game is
“scored.” Typically, changing the rules of the game (without changing the scoring, as through liability changes) maintains the firms’ original incentives to help
or hurt consumer bias, channeling the incentive into different behaviors by firms
or individuals, while changing the scoring of the game can alter those incentives.
The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation
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This perspective highlights the care that must be taken when transferring,
for example, the insights of defaults in 401(k) participation to other domains.
According to the present analysis, changing the rules on retirement saving (by
introducing defaults) works well because employers’ incentives align (or do not
misalign) with regulatory efforts to guide individual choice. In other words,
under current conditions, employers are either unaffected or may even be hurt
by individuals’ propensity to undersave in 401(k) plans.4 They thus will not
oppose an attempt to fix that problem. In other applications, where firms’
incentives misalign with regulatory intent, changing the rules alone may not
work well since firms may have the ability to work creatively around those rule
changes. Interestingly, such circumstances may lead to regulations (“changing
the scoring”) which, though deeply motivated by behavioral insights, are not
themselves particularly psychological in nature. That is, given market responses,
psychological rules such as defaults or framing may be too weak, and changes
in liability rules or other measures may be necessary, as we explain below.
This distinction in market responses to individual psychology is central to
our framework and is illustrated in table 1. In some cases, the market is either
neutral or wants to overcome consumer fallibility. In other cases, the market
would like to exploit or exaggerate consumer fallibility. Thus, when consumers
misunderstand compounding of interest in the context of saving, banks have
incentives to reduce this misunderstanding so that they can increase their deposits. When consumers misunderstand compounding in the context of borrowing,
lenders have little incentive to remove this misunderstanding, as it can only

Table 1. The Firm and the Individual
Behavioral
Fallibility

Market neutral and/or wants to
overcome consumer fallibility

Market exploits
consumer fallibility

Consumers
misunderstand
compounding

Consumers misunderstand
compounding in savings

Consumers misunderstand
compounding in borrowing

• Banks would like to reduce this
to increase savings base

• Banks would like to exploit
this to increase borrowing

Consumers
procrastinate

Consumers procrastinate in
signing up for EITC

Consumers procrastinate in
returning rebates

• Tax filing companies would like
to reduce this so as to increase
number of customers

• Retailers would like to exploit
this to increase revenues
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decrease the debts they are able to issue.5 When consumers procrastinate in
signing up for the EITC (and hence in filing for taxes) private tax preparation
firms have incentives to discourage such procrastination so as to increase their
customer base. When consumers procrastinate in returning rebates (but make
retail purchases as if they are going to get a rebate), retailers benefit. Note the
parallelism in these examples: firm incentives to alleviate or exploit a bias are
not an intrinsic feature of the bias itself. Instead, they are a function of how the
bias plays itself out in the particular market structure.
In the consumer credit market, we worry that many interactions between
individuals and firms are of the kind in which firms seek to exploit rather than
alleviate bias. If true, this raises the concern of overextrapolating from the
401(k) defaults example to credit products. To the extent that 401(k) defaults
work because optimal behavior is largely aligned with market incentives, other
areas, such as credit markets, might be more difficult to regulate with mere
defaults. Furthermore, if the credit market is dominated by “low-road” firms
offering opaque products that “prey” on human weakness, it is more likely that
regulators of such a market will be captured because “high-road” interests are
too weak to push back against low-road players; that market forces will defeat
positive defaults sets; and that low-road players will continue to dominate.
Many observers, for example, believe that the credit card markets are, in fact,
currently dominated by such low-road firms (see, for example, Mann 2007;
Bar-Gill 2004) and that formerly high-road players have come to adopt the sharp
practices of their low-road competitors. If government policymakers want to
attempt to use defaults in such contexts, they might need to deploy “stickier”
defaults or more aggressive policy options.
In our approach to the issue of regulatory choice the regulator can either
change the rules of the game or change the scoring of the game. Setting a
default is an example of changing the rules of the game, as is disclosure regulation. Specifically, the rules of the game are changed when there is an attempt to
change the nature of the interactions between individuals and firms, as when
the regulation attempts to affect what can be said, offered, or done. Changing
the scoring of the game, by contrast, changes the payoffs a firm will receive for
particular outcomes. This may be done without a particular rule about how the
outcome is to be achieved. For example, pension regulation that penalizes firms
whose 401(k) plan enrollment is top-heavy with highly paid executives is an
example of how scoring gives firms incentives to enroll low-income individuals
without setting particular rules on how this is done. Changing rules and changing
scoring often accompany each other, but they are conceptually distinct.
The discussion below illustrates how policies in the top right corner of table
2 face a particular challenge. Changing the rules of the game alone will be
The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation
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difficult when firms are highly motivated to find workarounds. As such, when
we suggest opt-out policies in mortgages below, the challenge will be to find
ways to make these starting positions “sticky” so that firms do not simply undo
their default nature. In our judgment, both achieving a good default and figuring out how to make it work requires separating low-road from high-road firms
and making it profitable for high-road firms to offer the default product
(for a related concept, see Kennedy 2005). For that to work, the default must be
sufficiently attractive to consumers, sufficiently profitable for high-road firms to
succeed in offering it, and penalties associated with deviations from the default
must be sufficiently costly so as to make the default “stick” even in the face of
market pressures from low-road firms. It may be that in some credit markets,
low-road firms have become so dominant that sticky defaults will be ineffectual.
Moreover, achieving such a default is likely more costly than making defaults
work when market incentives align, not least because the costs associated with
the stickiness of the default involve greater deadweight losses given that there
will be higher costs to opt out for those for whom deviating from the default
is optimal. These losses would need to be weighed against the losses from the
current system, as well as against losses from alternative approaches, such as
disclosure or product regulation. Nonetheless, given the considerations above,
it seems worth exploring whether such sticky defaults can help to transform
consumer financial markets.

Table 2. Behaviorally Informed Regulation

Rules

Market neutral and/or wants to
overcome consumer fallibility

Market exploits
consumer fallibility

Public education on saving

Sticky defaults (opt-out
mortgage or credit card)

Direct deposit/auto-save

Scoring
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Licensing

Information de-biasing on debt
(full information disclosure,
payoff time for credit cards)

Tax incentives for
savings vehicles

Ex post liability standard for
truth in lending

IRS Direct Deposit Accounts

Broker fiduciary duty and/or
changing compensation
(Yield Spread Premiums)
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The lessons of a more nuanced behavioral perspective are twofold. On the
one hand, people’s behavior is idiosyncratic, context dependent, and nuanced
in ways that render simple normative assumptions misleading and, in general,
complicate policy design. On the other hand, because behavior follows its own
rules, policymakers have an added responsibility to concern themselves with
appropriate context and detail, and a reason to hope that attention will lead to
improved outcomes.
As noted above, because of likely market responses to psychological factors
in different contexts, regulation may need to take a variety of forms, including
some that while informed by psychology are not designed to affect behavioral
change, but rather to alter the structure of the market in which relevant choices
are made. In what follows, we consider behaviorally informed regulation in the
context of mortgage, credit card, and banking markets, with specific proposals
that fall into each bin. Given the complexities involved, our purpose is not to
champion the specific policies below. Rather, we illustrate how a behaviorally
informed regulatory analysis may lead to a deeper understanding of the costs
and benefits, and to potentially improved designs, of specific policies.

III. Behaviorally Informed Policies
III.1 Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation
Full Information Disclosure to De-bias Borrowers
With the advent of nationwide credit reporting systems and the refinement of
credit scoring and modeling, creditors and brokers themselves, including not
just their credit scores, but their likely performance regarding a particular set of
loan products. Creditors will know whether borrowers could qualify for better,
cheaper loans, as well as how likely it is that borrowers will meet their obligations under an existing mortgage, or become delinquent, refinance, default,
or go into foreclosure. Yet lenders are not required to reveal this information
to borrowers. At the same time, the lack of disclosure of such information is
likely exacerbated by consumer beliefs. Consumers likely have false background
assumptions regarding what brokers and creditors reveal to them about their
borrowing status. What if consumers believe the following?
Creditors reveal all information about me and the loan products I am qualified
to receive. Brokers work for me in finding me the best loan for my purposes, and
lenders offer me the best loans for which I qualify. I must be qualified for the loan
I have been offered, or the lender would not have validated the choice by offering
me the loan. Because I am qualified for the loan that must mean that the lender
thinks that I can repay the loan. Why else would they lend me the money? Moreover,
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the government tightly regulates home mortgages; they make the lender give me all
these legal forms. Surely the government must regulate all aspects of this transaction.

In reality, the government does not regulate as borrowers believe, and lenders
do not necessarily behave as borrowers hope. Instead, information is hidden
from borrowers, information that would improve market competition and outcomes. Given consumers’ probably false background assumptions and the reality
of asymmetric information favoring lenders and brokers, we suggest that creditors
be required to reveal useful information to borrowers at the time of a mortgage
loan offer, including disclosure of borrowers’ credit scores, and borrowers’ qualifications for all of lenders’ mortgage products. Brokers could even be required
to reveal the wholesale rate sheet pricing—the rates at which lenders would be
willing to lend to each type of borrower. Such an approach corresponds to the
use of de-biasing information, in the top right of table 2.
The goal of these disclosures would be to put pressure on creditors and brokers to be honest in their dealings with applicants. The additional information
might improve comparison shopping and perhaps outcomes. Of course, revealing
such information would also reduce broker and creditor profit margins. But if
the classic market competition story relies on full information, and assumes
rational behavior based on understanding, we can view this proposal as simply
attempting to remove market frictions from information failures, and move the
market competition model more toward its ideal. By reducing information
asymmetry, full information disclosure would help to de-bias consumers and
lead to better competitive outcomes.

Ex Post Standards-based Truth in Lending
Optimal disclosure will not simply occur in all markets through competition
alone. Competition under a range of plausible scenarios will not necessarily
generate psychologically informative and actionable disclosure, as the current
crisis in the subprime mortgage sector suggests may have occurred. If competition does not produce informative disclosure, disclosure regulation might be
necessary. But simply because disclosure regulation is needed does not mean it
will work. Regulating disclosure appropriately is difficult and requires substantial
sophistication by regulators, including psychological insight.
A behavioral perspective could focus on improving disclosures themselves.
The goal of disclosure should be to improve the quality of information about
contract terms in meaningful ways. That would suggest, for example, that simply
adding information is unlikely to work. Disclosure policies are effective to the
extent that they present a frame—a way of perceiving the disclosure—that is
both well understood and conveys salient information that helps the decision
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maker act optimally. It is possible, for example, that information about the failure
frequency of particular products might help (for example, Two out of ten borrowers who take this kind of loan default), but proper framing can be difficult to
achieve and to maintain consistently, given that it may vary across situations.
Moreover, the attempt to improve decision quality through an improvement in
consumers’ understanding, which is presumed to change consumers’ intentions
to act, and finally their actual actions, is fraught with difficulty. There is often a
gap between understanding and intention, and particularly between intention
and action.
Furthermore, even if meaningful disclosure rules can be created, sellers can
undermine whatever before-the-fact or ex ante disclosure rule is established,
in some contexts simply by “complying” with it: Here’s the disclosure form I’m
supposed to give you, just sign here. For example, with rules-based ex ante disclosure requirements for credit, such as the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (TILA),
the rule is set up first, and the firm (the discloser) moves last. While an ex ante
rule provides certainty to creditors, whatever gave the discloser incentives to
confuse consumers remains in the face of the regulation. While disclosers may
officially comply with a given rule, they will nonetheless remain susceptible to
market pressure to find other means to avoid the salutary effects on consumer
decisions that the disclosure is intended to achieve.
In light of the difficulties of addressing such issues ex ante, we propose that
policymakers consider shifting away from sole reliance on a rules-based, ex ante
regulatory structure for disclosure embodied in TILA and toward integration
of an ex post, standards-based disclosure requirement as well. Rather than a
rule, we would deploy a standard, and rather than an ex ante decision about
content, we would permit the standard to be enforced after loans are made.
In essence, courts or expert agencies would determine whether the disclosure
would, under common understanding, have effectively communicated the key
terms of the mortgage to the typical borrower. This approach could be similar
to ex post determinations of reasonableness of disclaimers of warranties in sales
contracts under UCC 2-316 (see White and Summers 1995). This type of policy
intervention would correspond to a change in “scoring,” in the lower right of
table 2.
In our judgment, an ex post version of truth in lending based on a reasonable-person standard to complement the fixed disclosure rule under TILA
might permit innovation—both in products themselves and in strategies of
disclosure—while minimizing rule evasion. An ex post standard with sufficient
teeth could change the incentives of firms to confuse and would be more
difficult to evade. Under the current approach, creditors can easily “evade” TILA,
by simultaneously complying with its actual terms and making the required
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disclosures regarding the terms effectively useless in the context of the borrowing
decisions of consumers with limited attention and understanding. TILA, for
example, does not block a creditor from introducing a more salient term (Lower
monthly cost!) to compete with the APR for borrowers’ attention. Under an ex
post standards approach, by contrast, lenders could not plead compliance with
TILA as a defense. Rather, the question would be one of objective reasonableness: whether the lender meaningfully conveyed the information required for
a typical consumer to make a reasonable judgment about the loan. Standards
would also lower the cost of specification ex ante. Clarity of contract is hard
to specify ex ante but easier to verify ex post. Over time, through agency action,
guidance, model disclosures, “no action” letters, and court decisions, the parameters of the reasonableness standard would become known and predictable.
While TILA has significant shortcomings, we do not propose abandoning
it. Rather, TILA would remain (with whatever useful modifications to it might
be gleaned from our increased understanding of consumers’ emotions, thought
processes, and behaviors). Quite recently, for example, the Federal Reserve Board
unveiled major and useful changes to its disclosure rules, based in part on
consumer research.6 TILA would still be important in permitting comparisonshopping among mortgage products, one of its two central goals. However,
some of the burden of TILA’s second goal, to induce firms to reveal information
that would promote better consumer understanding, would be shifted to the ex
post standard.
Of course, there would be significant costs to such an approach, especially
at first. Litigation or regulatory enforcement would impose direct costs and
the uncertainty surrounding enforcement of the standard ex post might deter
innovation in the development of mortgage products. The additional costs of
compliance with a disclosure standard might reduce lenders’ willingness to
develop new mortgage products designed to reach lower-income or minority
borrowers who might not be served by the firms’ plain-vanilla products. The
lack of clear rules might also increase consumer confusion regarding how to
compare innovative mortgage products to each other, even while it increases
consumer understanding of the particular mortgage products being offered.
Even if we couple the advantages of TILA for mortgage comparisons with the
advantages of an ex post standard for disclosure in promoting clarity, the net
result may simply be greater confusion with respect to cross-loan comparisons.
That is, if consumer confusion results mostly from firm obfuscation, then
our proposal will likely help a good deal. By contrast, if consumer confusion in
this context results mostly from market complexity in product innovation, then
the proposal is unlikely to make a major difference, and other approaches
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focused on loan comparisons might be warranted (see, for example, Thaler and
Sunstein 2008).
Despite the shortcomings of an ex post standard for truth in lending, we
believe that such an approach is worth pursuing. To limit the costs associated
with our approach, the ex post determination of reasonableness could be significantly confined. For example, if courts are to be involved in enforcement, the
ex post standard for reasonableness of disclosure might be limited to providing
a (partial) defense to payment in foreclosure or bankruptcy, rather than being
open to broader enforcement through affirmative suit. Alternatively, rather than
court enforcement, the ex post standard might be enforced by the bank regulators or another expert consumer agency,7 through supervision and enforcement
actions. The ex post exposure might be significantly reduced through ex ante
steps. For example, regulators might develop safe harbors for reasonable disclosures, issue model disclosures, use “no action” letters to provide certainty to
lenders, and the like. Moreover, firms might be tasked with conducting regular
surveys of borrowers or conducting experimental design research to validate
their disclosures, with positive results from the research providing rebuttable
presumptions of reasonableness, or even safe harbors from challenge. The key is
to give the standard sufficient teeth without deterring innovation. The precise
contours of enforcement and liability are not essential to the concept, and
weighing the costs and benefits of such penalties is beyond the scope of what
we hope to do in introducing the idea here. Further work will be required to
detail the design for implementation.

“Sticky” Opt-Out Mortgage Regulation
While the causes of the mortgage crisis are myriad, a central problem was that
many borrowers took out loans that they did not understand and could not
afford. Brokers and lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive than
they really were, because of low initial monthly payments and costly hidden
features. Families commonly make mistakes in taking out home mortgages
because they are misled by broker sales tactics, misunderstand the complicated
terms and financial tradeoffs in mortgages, wrongly forecast their own behavior
and misperceive their risks of borrowing. How many homeowners really understand how the teaser rate, introductory rate, and reset rate relate to the London
interbank offered rate plus some specified margin, or can judge whether the
prepayment penalty will offset the gains from the teaser rate?
Improved disclosures might help. Altering the rules of the game of disclosure,
and altering the “scoring” for seeking to evade proper disclosure, may be sufficient to reduce the worst outcomes. However, if market pressures and consumer
confusion are sufficiently strong, such disclosure may not be enough. If market
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complexity is sufficiently disruptive to consumer choice, product regulation
might prove most appropriate. For example, by barring prepayment penalties,
we could reduce lock-in to bad mortgages; by barring short-term ARMs and
balloon payments, we could reduce refinance pressure; in both cases, more of the
cost of the loan would be pushed into interest rates and competition could focus
on a consistently stated price in the form of the APR. Price competition would
benefit consumers, who would be more likely to understand the terms on which
lenders were competing. Product regulation would also reduce cognitive and
emotional pressures related to potentially bad decision making by reducing the
number of choices and eliminating loan features that put pressure on borrowers
to refinance on bad terms. However, product regulation may stifle beneficial
innovation and there is always the possibility that government may simply get
it wrong.
For that reason, we propose a new form of regulation. We propose that a
default be established with increased liability exposure for deviations that harm
consumers. For lack of a better term, we call this a sticky opt-out mortgage system. As with opt-out regulation generally, a sticky opt-out system would fall,
in terms of stringency, somewhere between product regulation and disclosure;
however, for reasons we explain below, market forces would likely swamp a pure
opt-out regime—that’s where the need for stickiness comes in. This approach
corresponds to a combination of changing the rules of the game, in the top
right of table 2, and changing liability rules, at the bottom right of that table.
The proposal is grounded in our equilibrium model of firm incentives and
individual psychology. Borrowers may be unable to distinguish among complex
loan products and act optimally based on such an understanding (see, for example, Ausubel 1991). We thus deploy an opt-out strategy to make it easier for
borrowers to choose a standard product, and harder for borrowers to choose a
product that they are less likely to understand. At the same time, lenders may
seek to extract surplus from borrowers because of asymmetric information
about future income or default probabilities (see Musto 2007), and, in the short
term, lenders and brokers may benefit from selling borrowers loans they cannot
afford. Thus, a pure default would be undermined by firms, and regulation needs
to take account of this market pressure by pushing back.
In our model, lenders would be required to offer eligible borrowers a standard
mortgage (or set of mortgages), such as a fixed-rate, self-amortizing thirty-year
mortgage loan, according to reasonable underwriting standards. The precise
contours of the standard set of mortgages would be set by regulation. Lenders
would be free to charge whatever interest rate they wanted on the loan, and,
subject to the constraints outlined below, could offer whatever other loan products they wanted outside of the standard package. Borrowers, however, would
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get the standard mortgage offered, unless they chose to opt out in favor of a
nonstandard option offered by the lender, after honest and comprehensible disclosures from brokers or lenders about the terms and risks of the alternative
mortgages. An opt-out mortgage system would mean that borrowers would be
more likely to get straightforward loans they could understand.
But for the reasons cited above, a plain-vanilla opt-out policy is likely to be
inadequate. Unlike the savings context, where market incentives align well with
policies to overcome behavioral biases, in the context of credit markets, firms
often have an incentive to hide the true costs of borrowing. Given the strong
market pressures to deviate from the default offer, we would need to require
more than a simple opt-out to make the default sticky enough to make a difference in outcomes. Deviation from the offer would require heightened disclosures
and additional legal exposure for lenders in order to make the default sticky.
Under our plan, lenders would have stronger incentives to provide meaningful
disclosures to those whom they convince to opt out, because they would face
increased regulatory scrutiny, or increased costs if the loans did not work out.
Future work will need to explore in greater detail the enforcement mechanism. For example, under one potential approach to making the opt-out sticky,
if default occurs when a borrower opts out, the borrower could raise the lack of
reasonable disclosure as a defense to bankruptcy or foreclosure. Using an objective reasonableness standard akin to that used for warranty analysis under the
Uniform Commercial Code, if the court determined that the disclosure would
not effectively communicate the key terms and risks of the mortgage to the
typical borrower, the court could modify or rescind the loan contract.8 Another
alternative would be to have the banking agencies (or another expert consumer
agency) enforce the requirement on a supervisory basis, rather than relying
on the courts. The agency would be responsible for supervising the nature of
disclosures according to a reasonableness standard, and would impose a fine on
the lender and order corrective actions if the disclosures were found to be
unreasonable. The precise nature of the stickiness required and the tradeoffs
involved in imposing these costs on lenders would need to be explored in greater
detail, but in principle, a sticky opt-out policy could effectively leverage the
behavioral insight that defaults matter with the industrial-organizational insight
that certain market incentives work against a pure opt-out policy.
An opt-out mortgage system with stickiness might provide several benefits
over current market outcomes. Under the plan, a plain-vanilla set of default mortgages would be easier to compare across mortgage offers. Information would be
more efficiently transmitted across the market. Consumers would be likely to
understand the key terms and features of such standard products better than
they would alternative mortgage products. Price competition would more likely
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become salient once features are standardized. In behavioral terms, when alternative products are introduced, consumers would be made aware that such
alternatives represent deviations from the default, helping to anchor consumers
in the terms of the default product and providing some basic expectations for
what ought to enter into their choices. Framing the mortgage choice as one
between accepting a standard mortgage offer and needing affirmatively to choose
a nonstandard product should improve consumer decision making. Creditors
will be required to make heightened disclosures about the risks of the alternative
loan products for the borrower, subject to legal sanction in the event of failure
to reasonably disclose such risks; the legal sanctions should deter creditors from
making highly unreasonable alternative offers with hidden and complicated
terms. Consumers may be less likely to make significant mistakes. In contrast
to a pure product regulation approach, the sticky default approach would allow
lenders to continue to develop new kinds of mortgages, but only when they can
adequately explain key terms and risks to borrowers.
Moreover, requiring a default to be offered, accompanied by required heightened disclosures and increased legal exposure for deviations, may help to make
high-road lending more profitable than low-road lending—at least if deviations
resulting in harm are appropriately penalized. If offering an opt-out mortgage
product helps to split the market between high- and low-road firms, and rewards
the former, the market may shift (back) toward firms that offer home mortgage
products that better serve borrowers. For this to work effectively, the default—
and the efforts to make the default sticky—would need to enable the consumer
easily to distinguish the typical “good” loan, benefiting both lender and borrower, and which would be offered as the default, from a wide range of “bad”
loans: for example, those that benefit the lender with higher rates and fees
but harm the borrower; those that benefit the borrower but harm the lender;
and those that harm the borrower and lender but benefit third parties, such
as brokers.
There will be costs associated with requiring an opt-out home mortgage.
For example, the sticky defaults may not be sticky enough to alter outcomes,
given market pressures. The default could be undermined, as well, through the
firm’s incentive structures for loan officers and brokers, which could provide
greater rewards for nonstandard loans. Implementation of the measure may be
costly and the disclosure requirement and uncertainty regarding enforcement of
the standard might reduce overall access to home mortgage lending. There may
be too many cases in which alternative products are optimal, so that the default
product is in essence “incorrect,” and comes to be seen as such. The default would
then matter less over time, and forcing firms and consumers to go through the
process of deviating from it would become increasingly just another burden
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(like existing disclosure paperwork) along the road to getting a home mortgage
loan. Low-income, minority, or first-time homeowners who have benefited from
more flexible underwriting and more innovative mortgage developments might
see their access reduced if the standard set of mortgages does not include products suitable to their needs.
We could improve these outcomes in a variety of ways. For example, the
opt-out regulation could require that the standard set of mortgages include a
thirty-year fixed mortgage, a five- or seven-year adjustable-rate mortgage, and
straightforward mortgages designed to meet the particular needs of first-time,
minority, or low-income homeowners. We might develop “smart defaults,” based
on key borrower characteristics, such as income and age. With a handful of key
facts, an optimal default might be offered to an individual borrower. The optimal
default would consist of a mortgage or set of mortgages that most closely align
with the set of mortgages that the typical borrower with that income, age, and
education would prefer. For example, a borrower with rising income prospects
might appropriately be offered a five-year adjustable-rate mortgage. Smart
defaults might reduce error costs associated with the proposal and increase the
range of mortgages that can be developed to meet the needs of a broad range of
borrowers, including lower-income or first-time homeowners; however, smart
defaults may add to consumer confusion. Even if the consumer (with the particular characteristics encompassed by the smart default) only faces one default
product, spillover from too many options across the market may make decision
making more difficult. Moreover, it may be difficult to design smart defaults
consistent with fair lending rules.
Another approach to improve the standard mortgage choice set and to reduce
enforcement costs over time would be to build in banking agency supervision
as well as periodic required reviews of the defaults, with consumer experimental
design or survey research to test both the products and the disclosures, so that
the disclosures and the default products stay current with updated knowledge
of outcomes in the home mortgage market. Indeed, lenders might be required
to conduct such research and to disclose the results to regulators and the public
upon developing a new product and its related disclosures. In addition, regulators might use the results of the research to provide safe harbors for disclosures
that are shown to be reasonable ex ante through these methods. Regulators
could also issue “no-action” letters regarding disclosures that are deemed to be
reasonable through such research. The appropriate federal and state supervisory
agencies could be required to conduct ongoing supervision and testing of compliance with the opt-out regulations and disclosure requirements. The federal
and state banking agencies could easily adapt to this additional role with respect
to depositories, while the FTC, a new expert consumer finance agency, or state
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agencies would need to be provided with the authority and resources to conduct
ongoing supervisory and testing functions for nondepositories, instead of relying
solely on enforcement actions. Through these no-action letters, safe harbors,
supervision, and other regulatory guidance, the regulators can develop a body of
law that would increase compliance across the diverse financial sectors involved
in mortgage lending, while reducing the uncertainty facing lenders from the new
opt-out requirement, and providing greater freedom for financial innovation.

Restructure the Relationship Between Brokers and Borrowers
An alternative approach to addressing the problem of market incentives to
exploit behavioral biases would be to focus directly on restructuring brokers’ duties
to borrowers and reforming compensation schemes that provide incentives to
brokers to mislead borrowers. Mortgage brokers have dominated the subprime
market. Brokers generally have been compensated with “yield spread premiums”
(YSPs) for getting borrowers to pay higher rates than those for which the
borrower would qualify. Such YSPs have been used widely.9 In loans with yield
spread premiums, unlike other loans, there is wide dispersion in prices paid to
mortgage brokers. As Howell Jackson has shown, within the group of borrowers
paying yield spread premiums, African Americans paid $474 more for their
loans, and Hispanics $590 more, than white borrowers; thus, even if minority
and white borrowers could qualify for the same rate, in practice minority borrowers are likely to pay much more.10
Brokers cannot be monitored sufficiently by borrowers (see Jackson and
Burlingame 2007), and it is dubious that additional disclosures would help borrowers be better monitors (see, for example FTC 2007), in part because brokers’
disclosures of potential conflicts of interest may paradoxically increase consumer
trust (Cain et al 2005). Thus, if the broker is required to tell the borrower that
the broker works for himself, not in the interest of the borrower, the borrower’s
trust in the broker may increase—after all, the broker is being honest! Moreover,
evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis suggests that while in theory
creditors and investors have some incentives to monitor brokers, they do not do
so effectively.
It is possible to undertake an array of structural changes regarding the brokerborrower relationship. For example, we could alter the incentives of creditors
and investors to monitor mortgage brokers by changing liability rules to make
it clear that broker misconduct can be attributed to lenders and creditors in
suits by borrowers (see Engel and McCoy 2007). We could directly regulate
mortgage brokers through licensing and registration requirements (as is done
elsewhere; for example, in the U.K.); recent U.S. legislation now mandates
licensing and reporting requirements for brokers. In addition, the ex post
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disclosure standard we suggest might have a salutary effect by making it more
costly for lenders when brokers evade disclosure duties; this may lead to better
monitoring of brokers.
We also believe it is worth considering fundamentally altering the duties of
brokers by treating mortgage brokers as fiduciaries to borrowers, and subjecting
them to requirements similar to those that govern investment advisors under
the Investment Advisors Act. This would, of course, require vast changes to the
brokerage market, including to the ways in which mortgage brokers are compensated, and by whom. We would need to shift from a lender-compensation
system to a borrower-compensation system, and we would need a regulatory
system and resources to police the fiduciary duty. An interim step with much
lower costs, and potentially significant benefits, would be to ban yield spread
premiums. Banning YSPs could reduce some broker abuses by eliminating a
strong incentive for brokers to seek out higher-cost loans for customers. In fact,
quite recently a number of lenders have moved away from YSPs to fixed fees
with some funds held back until the loan has performed well for a period of
time, precisely because of broker conflicts of interest in seeking higher YSPs
rather than sound loans. Banning YSPs now would reinforce these high-road
practices and protect against a renewed and profitable low-road push for using
YSPs to increase market share once stability is restored to mortgage markets.
Banning YSPs would constitute a form of scoring change, corresponding to
regulation in the bottom right of table 2, because it affects the payoff brokers
receive for pursuing different mortgage outcomes.

III.2 Behaviorally Informed Credit Card Regulation
Using Framing and Salience in Disclosures
to Encourage Good Credit Card Behavior
Credit card companies have fine-tuned product offerings and disclosures in a
manner that appears to be systematically designed to prey on common psychological biases—biases that limit consumer ability to make rational choices
regarding credit card borrowing.11 Behavioral economics suggests that consumers
underestimate how much they will borrow and overestimate their ability to pay
their bills in a timely manner.12 Credit card companies can then price their
credit cards and compete on the basis of these fundamental human failings.13
Nearly 60 percent of credit card holders do not pay their bills in full every
month (Bucks et al 2006). Moreover, excessive credit card debt can lead to
personal financial ruin. Credit card debt is a good predictor of bankruptcy.14
Ronald Mann has argued that credit card companies seek to keep consumers
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in a “sweat box” of distressed credit card debt, paying high fees for as long as
possible before finally succumbing to bankruptcy.15
The 2005 bankruptcy legislation16 focused on the need for improved borrower responsibility but paid insufficient attention to creditor responsibility for
borrowing patterns. Credit card companies provide complex disclosures regarding
teaser rates, introductory terms, variable rate cards, penalties, and a host of other
matters. Both the terms themselves and the disclosures are confusing to consumers.17 Credit card companies are not competing, it appears, to offer the most
transparent pricing.
Going forward, regulatory and legislative steps could help prod the credit
card industry into better practices. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
intervened to require national banks to engage in better credit card practices
and to provide greater transparency on minimum payments,18 and the Federal
Reserve recently released proposed changes to its regulations under TILA, in
part in the wake of TILA amendments contained in the bankruptcy legislation.19 Under the proposals, for example, creditors would need to disclose that
paying only the minimum balance would lengthen the payoff time and interest
paid on the credit card; describe a hypothetical example of a payoff period
paying only the minimum balance; and provide a toll-free number for the consumer to obtain an estimate of actual payoff time.20 Although the very length
and complexity of the board’s proposal hints at the difficulty of the task of using
complex disclosure to alter consumer understanding and behavior, such improved
disclosures might nevertheless help.
But we could do much better. Congress could require that minimum payment terms be accompanied by clear statements regarding how long it would
take, and how much interest would be paid, if the customer’s actual balance
were paid off only in minimum payments, and card companies could be required
to state the monthly payment amount that would be required to pay the customer’s actual balance in full over some reasonable period of time, as determined by regulation. These tailored disclosures use framing and salience to help
consumers, whose intuitions regarding compounding and timing are weak, to
make better-informed payment choices based on their specific circumstances.
Such an approach would correspond to changing the rules in order to de-bias
consumers with behaviorally informed information disclosure, in the top right
of table 2. Although credit card companies have opposed such ideas in the past,
disclosures based on the customer’s actual balances are not overly burdensome.
Disclosures regarding the expected time to pay off actual credit card
balances are designed to provide a salient frame intended to facilitate more
optimal behavior. But such disclosures may not be strong enough to matter. The
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disclosures are geared toward influencing borrowers’ intention to alter their
behavior; however, even if the disclosure succeeds in shaping intention, we know
that there is often a large gap between intention and action (Buehler et al 2002;
Koehler and Poon 2005). In fact, borrowers would need to change behavior in
the face of strong inertia and marketing by credit card companies propelling them
to make no more than minimum payments. More generally, once such disclosure requirement were enacted, market players opposed to them would promptly
attempt to undermine them with countervailing marketing and other policies.

An Opt-Out Payment Plan for Credit Cards
A more promising approach, geared more directly toward shaping behavior
rather than influencing intentions, would be to develop an “opt-out payment
plan” for credit cards, under which consumers would be required automatically
to make the payment necessary to pay off their existing balance over a relatively
short period of time unless the customer affirmatively opted out of such a payment plan and chose an alterative payment plan with a longer (or shorter)
payment term.21 Such an approach corresponds to changing the rules through
opt-out policies, as in the top right of table 2. Given what we know about
default rules and framing, such a payment plan may be followed by many consumers. The payment plan would create expectations about consumer conduct
and in any event inertia would cause many households simply to follow the
plan. Increasing such behavior would mean lower rates of interest and fees paid,
and lower incidence of financial failure. In any event, confronting an optimal
payment plan may force cardholders to confront the reality of their borrowing,
and this may help to alter their borrowing behavior, or their payoff plans.
Moreover, credit card industry players would find it difficult to argue publicly
against reasonable opt-out payment plans and, in the face of such plans, to continue using a pricing model based on borrowers going into financial distress.
Of course, an opt-out payment plan will impose costs. Some consumers
who, in the absence of the opt-out payment plan, would have paid off their
credit cards much faster than the plan provides, might now follow the slower
payment plan offered as the default, thus incurring higher costs from interest and
fees, and possibly even facing a higher chance of financial failure. Alternatively,
some consumers might follow the opt-out payment plan when it is unaffordable
for them, consequently reducing necessary current consumption such as medical
care or sufficient food, or incurring other costly forms of debt. While there are
undoubtedly problems with such an approach, public debate over the proposal
would at least have the virtue of engaging all relevant players in an important
conversation about fundamental changes in market practice.
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Regulate Late Fees
A narrower intervention based on behavioral insights about credit card customers
would seek to change the behavior of credit card firms rather than consumers.
One problem with the pricing of credit cards is that credit card firms can charge
late and overlimit fees with relative impunity because consumers typically do
not believe ex ante that they will pay such fees. In principle, firms need to charge
late and overlimit fees to the extent that they wish to provide incentives to customers not to pay late or go over their credit card limits. In practice, given the
fees they charge, credit card firms are perfectly content to let consumers pay
late and go over their card limits, in order to obtain fee revenue from them.
We would change the scoring of the game (corresponding to a regulatory
choice in the bottom right of table 2). Under our proposal, firms could deter
consumers from paying late or going over their credit card limits with whatever
fees they deemed appropriate, but the bulk of such fees would be placed in a
public trust to be used for financial education and assistance to troubled borrowers. Firms would retain a fixed percentage of the fees to pay for their actual
costs incurred from late payments or overlimit charges, or for any increased
risks of default that such behavior presages. The benefit of such an approach is
that it permits firms to deter “bad conduct” by consumers, but prevents firms
from taking advantage of the psychological insight that consumers predictably
misforecast their own behavior with respect to paying late and borrowing over
their limit. Firm incentives to overcharge for late payments and overlimit borrowing would be removed, while firms would retain incentives appropriately to
deter these consumer failures.
As with our other proposals, there would be costs as well: in particular, the
reduced revenue stream to lenders from these fees would mean that other rates
and fees would be adjusted to compensate, and there is little reason to believe
that the adjustments would be in consumers’ favor. Moreover, taxing late and
overlimit fees in this manner might be seen as a significant interference with
contractual relationships beyond the form and content of disclosures required
under TILA for credit card agreements.
Opt-Out Credit Card
As a last option to consider in the credit card market, we might think about
a regulation requiring firms to offer a standard opt-out credit card. Elizabeth
Warren (2007) has argued that private sector firms should offer “clean” credit
cards with straightforward terms and honest pricing. We agree with her that
this would be a significant achievement and would set an important example
for others. Looking at the structure of the market, we might wonder whether
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such a high-road firm offering a clean credit card could win market share and
remain profitable. Given predictable consumer biases, such firms will have a hard
time competing with low-road players offering less transparent and seemingly
“better” offers. We thus wonder whether regulation might be designed to
reward high-road credit card firms while penalizing low-road firms offering
products designed to take advantage of consumer failings.
Warren’s innovative suggestion in this regard is for the creation of a consumer financial safety commission that could review credit card offers.22 Perhaps
an entity such as this could specify terms and conditions that are “safe” and
qualify for being offered as a standard credit card. As with the home mortgage
idea discussed earlier, consumers would be offered credit cards that meet the
definition of “safe.” They could opt for another kind of credit card, but only
after meaningful disclosure. And credit card firms would face increased liability
risk if the disclosure were found to have been unreasonable. As with our earlier
concept, the precise details of liability determination and consequences would
need to be carefully calibrated. In essence, the proposal would permit firms to
continue to innovate in credit card practices, but with strong pressure to adopt
straightforward practices and with the risk of increased consequences to firms
when consumers opt out and wind up in trouble. This type of sticky opt-out
provision, as with our proposal for an opt-out home mortgage, would correspond to changing both the rules and the scoring of the game on the right side
of table 2.

III.3 Increasing Saving Among LMI Households
Savings is an area ripe for further behavioral attention. So far, much of behaviorally informed saving policy has focused on using defaults to improve retirement
saving. For many low- and moderate-income households, however, there is a
much greater need to focus on basic banking services and short-term savings
options, services which, for this population, may require a different mix of governmental responses than those envisioned in the context of retirement savings
for middle- and upper-income households.
Many low- and moderate-income (LMI) individuals lack access to the sort
of financial services that middle-income families take for granted, such as
checking accounts or easily utilized savings opportunities. High-cost financial
services, barriers to savings, lack of insurance, and credit constraints increase
the economic challenges faced by LMI families. In the short run, it is often
hard for these families to deal with fluctuations in income that occur because
of job changes, instability in hours worked, medical illnesses or emergencies,
changes in family composition, or myriad other factors that can cause abrupt
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changes in economic inflows and outflows. At low income levels, small income
fluctuations may create serious problems in paying rent, utilities, or other bills.
Moreover, the high costs and low utility of the financial transaction services
used by many low-income households extract a daily toll on take-home pay.
Limited access to mainstream financial services reduces ready opportunities to
save and thus limit families’ ability to build assets and to save for the future.
In theory, opt-out policies ought to work well here, as in the retirement
world, in encouraging saving by such households. However, while in general
the market pulls in the same direction as policy for saving, market forces
weaken or break down entirely with respect to encouraging saving for lowincome households. This is simply because the administrative costs of collecting
small-value deposits are high in relation to banks’ potential earnings on the
relatively small amounts saved, unless the bank can charge high fees; with sufficiently high fees, however, it is not clear that having a bank account makes
economic sense for LMI households. Indeed, the current structure of bank
accounts is one of the primary reasons why LMI households do not have them.
With respect to transaction accounts, high minimum-balance requirements,
high fees for overdraft protection or bounced checks, and delays in check clearance dissuade LMI households from opening or retaining bank accounts.
Moreover, banks use the private ChexSystems to screen out households who
have had difficulty with accounts in the past. Behaviorally insightful tweaks are
unlikely to suffice in this context; rather, we need to devise methods to change
the nature of the products being offered and, with them, the behavior of the
consumers who open and maintain the accounts.
In this area, we need to figure out how to increase scale and offset costs for
the private sector, in addition to increasing saving by low- and moderate-income
families. As explained more fully below, we propose two options: a new tax credit
to financial institutions for offering safe and affordable bank accounts, and a
proposal under which the IRS would direct deposit tax refunds into “opt-out”
bank accounts automatically set up through private sector financial institutions
at tax time. Both proposals are designed to induce the private sector to change
their account offerings by offering tax subsidies or government bundling to
reach scale, as well as to alter consumer behavior through the structure of the
accounts offered. The proposals pertain to changing the rules and the scoring
on the left hand side of table 2, where markets may prove neutral to, or even
positively inclined toward, the potential overcoming of consumer fallibility. In
particular, the tax credit and government backing change the scoring to firms
for offering such products, while the opt-out nature of the proposal changes the
starting rules.
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Tax Credit to Financial Institutions for
Offering Safe and Affordable Bank Accounts
To overcome the problem of the high fixed costs of offering sensible transaction
accounts to low-income individuals with low savings levels, Congress could
enact a pay-for-performance tax credit for financial institutions that offer safe
and affordable bank accounts to LMI households (see Barr 2004, 2007). With
such a tax credit, financial institutions would be entitled to claim tax credits
for a fixed amount per account opened by LMI households. The bank accounts
eligible for the tax credit could be structured and priced by the private sector,
but according to essential terms required by regulation. For example, costly and
inefficient checking accounts with high risk of overdraft or costly hidden
features would be eschewed in favor of low-cost, low-risk accounts with only
debit-card access. In particular, bank accounts would be debit-card based, with no
check-writing capability, no overdrafts permitted, and no ChexSystems rejections
for past account failures, in the absence of fraud or other meaningful abuse.
The power of the tax credit initiative could be significantly increased if it
were coupled with a series of behaviorally informed efforts to improve take-up
of the accounts and savings outcomes for account holders. For example, banks
could reach out to employers to encourage direct deposit and automatic savings
plans to set up default rules that would increase savings outcomes. With an
automatic savings plan, accounts could be structured so that holders could designate a portion of their paycheck to be deposited into a savings “pocket”; the
savings feature would rely on the precommitment device of automatic savings,
and funds would be somewhat more difficult to access than those in the regular
bank account, in order to make the commitment more likely to stick. To provide
necessary access to emergency funds in a more cost effective manner than
usually available to LMI households, the bank account could also include a sixmonth consumer loan with direct deposit and direct debit, using relationship
banking and automated payment systems to provide an alternative to costly payday loans. With direct deposit of income and direct debit of interest and principal due, the loan should be relatively costless to service and relatively low-risk
for the bank. With a longer payment period than usual for payday lending, the
loan should be more manageable for consumers living paycheck to paycheck,
and would likely lead to less repeated borrowing undertaken to stay current on
past payday loans. Moreover, the loan repayment features could also include a
provision that consumers “pay themselves first,” by including a savings deposit
to their account with every payment. Such a precommitment device could overcome the tendency to procrastinate in savings and reduce the likelihood of
needing future emergency borrowing. All these efforts could increase take-up
of the banking product and lead to improved savings outcomes.
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An Opt-Out Bank Account for Tax Refunds
Congress could also enact a new, opt-out “tax refund account” plan to encourage
savings and expanded access to banking services, while reducing reliance on
costly refund loans (see Barr 2007). Under the plan, unbanked low-income
households who file their tax returns would have their tax refunds directly
deposited into a new account. Banks agreeing to offer safe and affordable bank
accounts would register with the IRS to offer the accounts, and a fiscal agent
for the IRS would draw from a roster of banks offering these services in the
taxpayer’s geographic area in assigning the new accounts. On receiving the
account number from its fiscal agent, the IRS would directly deposit EITC
(and other tax refunds) into those accounts. Taxpayers could choose to opt out
of the system if they did not want to directly deposit their refund, but we would
expect the accounts to be widely accepted since they would significantly reduce
the costs for taxpayers of receiving their tax refunds. Once the tax refund
account is set up through the IRS mechanism at tax time, households would
receive their tax refund in the account, weeks earlier than if they had to wait for
a paper check. Moreover, once it is established, the account could continue to
be used long past tax time. Households could also use the account just like any
other bank account—to receive their income, to save, to pay bills, and the like.
By using an opt-out strategy and reaching households at tax time, this
approach could help to overcome consumer biases to procrastinate in setting
up accounts. By reducing the time it takes to receive a refund, setting up such
accounts could help to reduce the incentives to take out costly refund loans, incentives that are magnified by temporal myopia and widespread misunderstanding
of the costs of credit. This system could dramatically, efficiently, and quickly
reach millions of LMI households and bring them into the banking system. A
complementary approach (Koide 2007) would reach sufficient scale by using
prepaid debit cards and pooled accounts offered by a single vendor chosen by
the IRS, rather than individual bank accounts offered by a large number of
financial institutions. In this manner, the private sector vendor would be assured
a large scale of operations. In either event, opt-out strategies and government
incentives would be coupled to reach low-income households with essential
banking services.

IV. Concluding Remarks
We propose a different approach to regulation. Whereas the classical perspective
assumes that people generally know what is important and knowable, plan with
insight and patience, and carry out their plans with wisdom and self-control,
the central gist of the behavioral perspective is that people often fail to know
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and understand things that matter; that they misperceive, misallocate, and fail
to carry out their intended plans; and that the context in which people function
has great impact on their behavior, and, consequently, merits careful attention
and constructive work. In our framework, successful regulation requires integrating this richer view of human behavior with our understanding of markets. Firms
will operate on the contour defined by this psychology and will respond strategically to regulations. As we describe above, because firms have a great deal of
latitude in issue framing, product design, and so on, they have the capacity to
affect behavior and circumvent or pervert regulatory constraints. Ironically, firms’
capacity to do so is enhanced by their interaction with “behavioral” consumers
(as opposed to the hypothetically rational actors of neoclassical economic theory),
since so many of the things a regulator would find very hard to control (for example, frames, design, complexity, etc.) can greatly influence consumers’ behavior.
The challenge of behaviorally informed regulation, therefore, is to be well designed
and insightful both about human behavior and about the behaviors that firms
are likely to exhibit in response to both consumer behavior and regulation.
With that in mind, we have outlined ten ideas: (1) full information disclosure to de-bias home mortgage borrowers; (2) a new standard for truth in lending;
(3) a “sticky” opt-out home mortgage system; (4) restructuring the relationship
between brokers and borrowers; (5) using framing and salience to improve credit
card disclosures; (6) an opt-out payment plan for credit cards; (7) an opt-out credit
card; (8) regulating of credit card late fees; (9) a tax credit for banks offering safe
and affordable accounts; and (10) an opt-out bank account for tax refunds. These
examples, we hope, will serve to encourage more behaviorally informed regulation in years to come.

Notes
1 For more details, see: http://legacy.americanpayroll.org/pdfs/paycard/DDsurv_
results0212.pdf.
2 We recognize that there are significant compliance issues regarding pensions and
retirement plans, disclosure failures, fee churning and complicated and costly fee
structures, conflicts of interest in plan management, as well as problems with encouraging employers to sign up low-wage workers for retirement plans. We do not mean
to suggest that these failings are trivial—far from it. We only mean to suggest that,
as a comparative matter, market incentives to overcome psychological biases in order to
encourage saving are more aligned with optimal social policy than market incentives
to exacerbate psychological biases that encourage borrowing.
3 We use this bimodal framework of regulatory choice to simplify the exploration of
how our model of individual psychology and firm incentives affects regulation. We
acknowledge that the regulatory choice matrix is more complex (see Barr 2005).
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4 This is largely because of the existing regulatory framework: pension regulation gives
employers incentives to enroll lower-income individuals in 401(k) programs. Absent
this, it is likely that firms would be happy to discourage enrollment since they often
must pay the match for these individuals. This point is interesting because it suggests
that even defaults in savings only work because some other regulation “changed the
scoring” of the game.
5 This example abstracts from collection costs (which would reduce firms’ incentives to
hide borrowing costs) and instead focuses on the short-term behavior generally exhibited by firms, as in the recent home mortgage crisis.
6 See Federal Reserve Board, Final Rule Amending Regulation Z, 12 CFR part 226
( July 14, 2008); Summary of Findings: Consumer Testing of Mortgage Broker
Disclosures, submitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July
10, 2008; Federal Reserve Board, Proposed Rule Amending Regulation Z, 12 CFR
part 226 ( June 14, 2007), Federal Register 72, no. 114: 32948; Design and Testing of
Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures, Submitted to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, May 16, 2007.
7 Elizabeth Warren, for example, has proposed a new Financial Product Safety Com
mission. See Warren 2007.
8 A more aggressive approach would be to permit class-action litigation on an affirmative
basis. In this paper, we are not yet able to balance the costs of class-action litigation
against the benefits of stronger enforcement.
9 See Jackson and Burlingame 2007, p. 127. While in principle yield-spread premiums
could permit lenders legitimately to pass on the cost of a mortgage broker fee to a
cash-strapped borrower in the form of a higher interest rate rather than in the form
of a cash payment, the evidence suggests that yield-spread premiums are in fact used
to compensate brokers for getting borrowers to accept higher interest rates, prepayment penalties, and other loan terms.
10 Ibid.: 125; see also Guttentag 2000.
11 See generally Bar-Gill 2004: 1373.
12 Ibid.: 1395–96.
13 Ibid.: 1394–95.
14 Mann 2006: 60–69.
15 Mann 2007: 375.
16 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub L. no.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq [2005]).
17 See, for example U.S. General Accounting Office, “Credit Cards: Increased Complexity
in Rates and Fees Heightens the Need for More Effective Disclosures to Consumers,”
Report 06-929, 2006.
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18 See, for example, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Bull. 2003-1,
“Credit Card Lending: Account Management and Loss Allowance Guidance” (2003);
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter 2004-4, “Secured
Credit Cards” (2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-4.doc;
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter 2004-10, “Credit Card
Practices” (2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-10.doc.
19 See press release, Federal Reserve Board, Proposed Amendments to Regulation Z,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Press/bcreg/2007/20070523/
default.htm (May 23, 2007).
20 Federal Reserve Board, Proposed Rule, 12 C.F.R. 226, proposed §.7(b)(12), implementing 15 U.S.C. §1637(b)(11).
21 Barr (2007). For a related proposal, see Gordon and Douglas 2005 (arguing for an
opt-out direct-debit arrangement for credit cards.
22 Ibid.
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